We analyze the impact of the U.S. skill-biased immigration in ‡ux that took place between 2000 and 2009, within a search and matching model that allows for skill heterogeneity, di¤erential search cost and capital-skill complementarity. We …nd that although the skill-biased immigration raised the overall net income to natives, it had distributional e¤ects. Speci…cally, unskilled native workers gained in terms of both employment and wages. Skilled native workers, on the other hand, gained in terms of employment but lost in terms of wages. Nevertheless, in an extension where skilled natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes, even the skilled wage rises.
Introduction
The impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes in the host country has long been a subject of debate among economists. The results provided by a large number of careful empirical studies on this subject are often contradictory. For example, Borjas (2003) and Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) …nd a large negative wage e¤ect on natives, whereas Card (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) …nd this e¤ect to be relatively small and often positive. Among the key issues behind this disagreement is the elasticity of substitution between native and immigrants in the same skill group. In particular, as it is now well understood, imperfect substitution between native and immigrant labor can generate a positive e¤ect on native wages. This paper aspires to contribute to the debate regarding the impact of immigration by following a di¤erent approach. We conduct our analysis within a search and matching model of the labor market (e.g., Diamond, 1982 and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) . In this class of models, unemployment exists due to search frictions and job entry responds endogenously to market incentives. Thus, contrary to the competitive paradigm, our approach allows for the analysis of the unemployment and wage e¤ects that come from the impact of changes in the availability of jobs on the bargaining position of workers.
In addition, our baseline model has the following key features. First, it allows for the presence of di¤erential search costs between natives and immigrants, which, besides adding further realism to the model, is a key factor in explaining the equilibrium wage gap between otherwise identical native and immigrant workers. This feature generates also the possibility that immigration improves the employment and wage prospects of competing natives, since immigrants, who have a lower outside option, are willing to accept lower wages. Hence, an immigration in ‡ux lowers the average wage that …rms expect to pay, leading to more job entry and consequently a better bargaining position for native workers.
Second, we incorporate in the set-up skill heterogeneity among native workers as well as between natives and immigrants. This allows us to analyze the distributional e¤ects of immigration on di¤erent skill groups. Third, the presence of capital as an independent factor of production serves as an additional channel of adjustment to immigration-induced changes in labor supply. Fourth, we adopt a generalized production technology that allows for the analysis of the impact of immigration under di¤erent assumptions regarding the degrees of capital-skill, within-skill and across-skill complementarity. We calibrate the model to the US economy and …nd that the impact of the skill-biased increase in immigration that took place between 2000 and 2009 is positive on the overall net income to natives. As expected, it lowers the unemployment and raises the wage rate of unskilled native workers. This occurs for two reasons. First, skill-biased immigration in ‡ux raises the marginal product of unskilled labor and second, the entrance of unskilled immigrants lowers the expected employment cost, owing to the lower wages paid to immigrants, and encourages unskilled job entry. However, we also …nd that it encourages skilled job entry, leading to a smaller unemployment rate for skilled workers as well. The increase in skilled job entry is also due to …rms anticipating that, with a higher number of skilled immigrants searching for jobs, they will have to pay lower wages on average. As regards the wage of skilled native workers, on the one hand, the higher availability of skilled jobs strengthens their bargaining position and pushes their wage up, but, on the other, the fall in their marginal product, due to the relatively higher quantity of skilled labor, causes their wage to fall. In our baseline calibration we let immigrants and natives of the same skill type be perfect substitutes in production and …nd the overall impact on the wage of skilled natives to be negative.
Although there is a vast empirical literature on this topic, the number of theoretical studies that analyze immigration within a dynamic general equilibrium framework is relatively small. Furthermore, most of them employ the standard neoclassical growth model; examples include, but are not limited to, Hazari and Sgro (2003) , Ben-Gad (2004 , 2008 , Moy and Yip (2006) , and Palivos (2009) . To the best of our knowledge, the only other papers that analyze immigration within a search framework are those of Ortega (2000) and Liu (2010) . The former considers a two-country model where workers decide whether to search in their own country or immigrate. He shows that Pareto-ranked multiple steadystate equilibria may arise with or without immigration. Ortega's analysis also takes into account the positive impact of immigration on job entry due to …rms anticipating that they will pay lower wages to immigrants that have higher search costs. However, the model in Ortega (2000) assumes that worker productivity is constant and therefore independent of immigration in ‡ux. Moreover, since there is only one labor type, his analysis overlooks both the negative e¤ect on the marginal product of native workers and the across-skill externalities that arise when otherwise identical natives and immigrants compete for the same types of jobs.
Liu (2010) concentrates on the welfare e¤ects of illegal immigration within a dynamic general equilibrium model with search frictions. The presence of search frictions allows him to identify a new channel through which immigration can alter domestic consumption: intensi…ed job competition from illegal immigrants lowers the job …nding rate of native workers and forces them to accept lower wages. Our model is closer to an extended version of his baseline model, where there are two types of domestic labor, namely, skilled and unskilled, and illegal immigrants belong to the unskilled group. Thus, unlike Liu (2010) , who considers only illegal and hence unskilled immigration, we look at the e¤ects of total immigration during the period 2000-2009, which according to the data is skill-biased. In addition, the existence of di¤erent outside options (search costs) between natives and immigrants in our framework allows us to capture the e¤ect of immigration on job entry through its impact on expected employment costs.
As regards the production technology, the main di¤erence between our model and Liu's extended model is that we employ a nested CES aggregator that allows for skilled labor to be more complimentary to capital than unskilled labor, whereas Liu assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function, which implies that the two types of labor are equally complementary to capital. Furthermore, Liu's extended model assumes that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes, while, in an extension of the model, we also explore the case of imperfect substitutability between the two labor types. Our assumptions regarding the production technology are closer to those of Ben-Gad (2008), who analyzes a neoclassical growth model with overlapping dynasties and two types of labor, but does not allow for search frictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model. Section 3 de…nes the steady-state equilibrium and analyzes its existence and uniqueness.
In Section 4, we analyze two special cases of the model. In the …rst, we assume that there are no di¤erences in search costs between otherwise identical native and immigrant workers. In the second, we assume di¤erential search costs, but let the two labor inputs (skilled and unskilled) be perfect substitutes to each other. Considering these two cases separately allows us to identify two di¤erent channels through which immigration can a¤ect labor market outcomes: one that comes from the impact on …rms'expected cost of establishing an employment relation and one that comes from the impact on the prices of labor inputs. In Section 5 we calibrate the model and present simulation results in the general case when both of these channels are present. Section 6 presents the results of several extensions and Section 7 concludes. 1 
The Model
We construct a search and matching model with two intermediate inputs and one …nal consumption good. Time is continuous: The economy is populated by a continuum of workers and a continuum of jobs. Workers are either natives (N ) or immigrants (I):
The mass of natives is normalized to unity, while that of immigrants is denoted by I and is determined exogenously. The mass of jobs, on the other hand, is determined endogenously as part of the equilibrium. All agents are risk neutral and discount the future at the interest rate r. The rest of this section o¤ers a detailed description of the model.
Workers and Firms
Workers are either skilled (H) or unskilled (L): 2 Let be the fraction of native workers that are unskilled (in the benchmark version of the model is given). Similarly, immigrants are either skilled or unskilled and their numbers, denoted by I H and I L respectively, are determined exogenously. All workers are born and die at the rate n.
Our production side borrows from Acemoglu (2001 which support the idea that skilled labor is relatively more complementary to capital than unskilled labor, we post the following production technology for the …nal good
where K denotes capital, and x are positive parameters that govern income shares and and drive the elasticities of substitution between capital and the unskilled input and the equilibrium. 2 We use the terms skilled (unskilled) and high-(low-) skill interchangeably.
capital and the skilled input, respectively. Thus, the production function is a two-level CES function in which capital and the skilled input (Y H ) are nested together in the subaggregate input Q given by equation (2) Since the two intermediate inputs are sold in competitive markets, their prices, p L and p H ; will be equal to their marginal products, that is,
We assume that there exists a competitive capital market in which …rms can buy and sell capital without delay. Since the market is competitive, the marginal product of capital is equal to its rental price (p K ); which is in turn equal to the interest rate plus its depreciation rate ( ). Thus,
Search and Matching
We dispense with the Walrasian auctioneer and assume that in each of the two labor markets unemployed workers and un…lled vacancies are brought together via a stochastic matching technology M (U i ; V i ); where U i and V i denote respectively the number of unemployed workers and vacancies of skill type i; i = H; L: This function M ( ) exhibits standard properties: it is at least twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing in its arguments, linearly homogeneous and satis…es the familiar Inada conditions. Using the property of constant returns to scale, we can write the ‡ow rate of a match for a worker as M (U i ; V i )=U i = m( i ) and the ‡ow rate of a match for a vacancy as M (
is an indicator of the tightness prevailing in labor market i. Also, the above-mentioned assumptions on M ( ) imply m 0 ( i ) > 0 and q 0 ( i ) < 0: sector. Also, for simplicity, we assume that creating a vacancy is costless, although this can be easily amended following, for example, Wang (1995, 2003) .
The instant a vacancy and a worker make contact, they bargain over the division of any surplus. The skill level of the worker as well as the output that will result from a match is known to both parties. We assume that wages are determined by an asymmetric Nash bargaining, where the worker has bargaining power : After an agreement has been reached, production commences immediately. Moreover, we assume that matches dissolve at the rate s i . Following a separation, the worker and the vacancy enter the corresponding market and search for new trading partners should it prove pro…table for them to do so.
In addition, unemployed workers are subject to a per unit of time "search" cost, h ij ;
which is speci…c to the worker's skill type i = H; L, and origin j = N; I, where N denotes "native" and I denotes "immigrant." There are several reasons why an immigrant may face a higher search cost or equivalently a lower income while being unemployed and searching for a job. In addition to the problems that one may encounter if being in a foreign country (e.g., lack of a social network, lower language pro…ciency, etc.), lower income may result if immigrants do not qualify for the same unemployment insurance bene…ts as natives. 3 More generally, however; h ij may denote a di¤erence in the outside option b i . Henceforth, we assume that h iN = 0 < h iI ; implying that an immigrant worker has a lower outside option than a native who is of the same skill type.
Asset Value Functions
At any point in time a worker is either employed or unemployed and a vacancy is either …lled or un…lled: We denote the present discounted value associated with each state by J ij , where i = H; L denotes the skill type (high-or low-skill), j = N; I denotes the origin (native or immigrant), and = V; U; F; E; indicates the state (vacant …rm, unemployed worker, …lled job, employed worker). Then in steady state:
where i is the fraction of unemployed workers of skill type i that are natives and h ij = 0 if j = N: Also, w ij denotes the wage rate for a worker of skill type i = H; L and origin j = N; I: Expressions such as these have, by now, a familiar interpretation. For instance, consider equation (6): The term rJ V i is the ‡ow value accrued to an unmatched vacancy of type i: it equals the loss from maintaining a vacant position plus the ‡ow probability of becoming matched with a worker of the same type multiplied by the expected capital gain from such an event. The other asset value equations possess similar interpretation.
As there is free entry and exit on the …rm side in each intermediate input market, an additional vacancy of skill type i should make expected net pro…t equal to zero, that is,
Nash Bargaining
Since all workers and …rms are risk neutral, Nash bargaining implies that the wage rate for a worker of skill type i and origin j; w ij ; must be such that:
In other words, …rms get a share 1 and workers get of the total surplus S ij generated by a match, where
Steady-State Composition of the Labor Force
Recall that I H and I L denote the mass of skilled and unskilled immigrants. Thus, the total mass of skilled (unskilled) workers in the economy is 1 + I H ( + I L ). Next by equating the ‡ows out of unemployment to the sum of separations and new births, we can …nd the steady-state employment, and hence the production of each intermediate input:
Similarly, the steady-state unemployment U ij of each type i and origin j is given by:
Moreover, as mentioned above, the probability that a type i and unemployed worker is native is denoted by i and is equal to
where
3 Steady-State Equilibrium Consider next the de…nition of a steady-state equilibrium for this economy. (ii) The capital market clears; i.e., condition (5) is satis…ed.
(iii) The free entry condition (10) for each skill type i is satis…ed.
(iv) The Nash bargaining optimality condition (11) for each skill type i and origin j holds.
(v) The numbers of employed and unemployed workers as well as of …lled and un…lled vacancies of each type and origin remain constant; i.e., conditions (12)-(14) are satis…ed.
It can be shown that the steady-state equilibrium values of H and L are given by the following reduced system of equations:
where A i ;
and k are the employment rate of type i, the ratio of unskilled to skilled labor and the capital to skilled labor ratio, respectively. They are de…ned as follows
;
Each of equations (15) and (16) is a zero expected pro…t condition in the unskilled and skilled input market, respectively. The left-hand-side, which equals p i ; i = L; H; is the revenue and the right-hand-side, B i ; the expected cost to an un…lled vacancy of skill type i from being matched randomly with a worker of the same type.
Recall that (1) and (2) imply diminishing marginal products and Edgeworth complementarity between two di¤erent inputs, that is, @p i =@Y i < 0 and @p i =@Y j > 0 for i 6 = j.
Therefore, an increase in i ; which raises the employment and production of input i (Y i );
decreases its price p i (=marginal product): Also, an increase in i raises the time required to …ll a vacant position of type i and hence increases its expected cost B i : Thus, if, for example, the left-hand-side of (15) is higher than its right-hand-side (i.e., p L > B L ), then it is pro…table to post unskilled vacancies and L increases until the equilibrium is restored.
Finally, an increase in the tightness in market j ( j ) raises the employment of input j and thus leads to a higher price of input i; i 6 = j:
Having determined H and L ; we can get the equilibrium values for the other variables by substituting in the appropriate equations. In particular, the unemployment rates (u ij ) follow from equations (13) to (14) ; for example, the unemployment rate among skilled natives, which is equal to the one among skilled immigrants, is given by
Finally, the wage rates are given by
Note that equation (17) can be written as
that is, the worker's wage is a convex combination of his outside option ((r + n)J U ij ) and his marginal product (= p i ). Therefore, an increase in tightness i and thus the matching rate m( i ) has two e¤ects on the wage rate of a worker of type i: one negative through the price p i -an increase in the matching rate raises employment and thus decreases the marginal product and price of input i -and one positive through the outside optionan increase in the matching rate raises the value of search and hence the outside option, which strengthens the worker's bargaining position. The curve OH, on the other hand, is the locus of values of H and L that make the expected pro…t from establishing a high-skill vacancy equal to zero (described by equation 16 ). It has a positive slope because an increase in H leads to a higher expected cost (B H ) and a lower price (p H ) in the skilled sector: Hence, there must be an increase in L , which will raise the price of the high-skill input and restore the zero-pro…t condition p H = B H :
Notice from equation (17) that the wage rate of a native worker who is of type i is higher than that of an immigrant who is of the same skill type. In other words, …rms extract higher surplus from immigrants. Therefore, we need to exclude the case where a …rm that meets a native worker decides not to form an employment relation and continues to search. The following condition su¢ ces for that:
Condition 1 (Precluding the Option to Wait)
The left-hand side is the average cost of a vacant position of type i while the right-hand side is the expected net bene…t from hiring an immigrant of type i: Condition 1 (written as an equality) establishes the minimum level of market tightness i for a meaningful equilibrium. Given that …rms and workers get a constant share of the surplus S ij , the same condition ensures that J E ij J U ij ; i.e., an unemployed worker will not turn down an employment opportunity and continue searching.
Equilibrium with Search Frictions
In general, a change in the number of skilled or unskilled immigrants I i ; i = H; L; can in ‡uence the equilibrium through the impact of such a change on i) prices p i and ii) expected employment costs B i . Before analyzing the equilibrium in the general case, where a change in I i is propagated through both of these channels, it is instructive to examine each case separately. Speci…cally, we analyze two special cases: …rst, we set the immigrant search cost h iI equal to zero, so that there is no di¤erence anymore between a native and an immigrant worker of the same skill type. In other words, this assumption implies that w ij = w i for each j and hence a …rm is indi¤erent between hiring an immigrant and a native worker with the same skills. In this case, a change in I i has no impact on employment cost B i ; thus, it in ‡uences the equilibrium only through its impact on prices.
The second special case that we analyze below is the one where h iI > 0; but the two intermediate inputs are perfect substitutes ( = 1): In this case the two input prices are always independent of I i : Therefore, a change in I i can a¤ect the labor market outcomes only through its impact on employment cost B i . Finally, it follows from equations (15) and (16) that our approach exhausts all possible channels of in ‡uence, since if = 1 and h iI = 0; then the equilibrium is independent of the number of immigrants.
Variable Prices and no Search Costs
Consider …rst the case where < 1 and the search cost, h iI ; is equal to zero. The latter assumption implies that there is no di¤erence between a native worker and an immigrant of the same type; in particular, w ij = w i 8j: The e¤ects of a change in I L have analogous signs.
An increase in I H raises the productivity of unskilled labor and lowers that of skilled.
Hence, p L goes up, while p H goes down. Since higher (lower) prices lead to higher (lower) pro…ts, this induces the entry of unskilled jobs and raises L ; at the same time, it discourages the entry of skilled jobs and lowers H . We can demonstrate these e¤ects graphically (15) and (16) 
Fixed Prices and Search Cost
Next we analyze the other special case where = 1 but h iI > 0: Here the results are very di¤erent from the ones found above. In particular, consider ; where, as implied by (2) and (5), k assumes a constant value: On the other hand, the employment cost to a …rm of type i; B i ; depends on the relative number of native to total labor of type i, i (and not on ): This is so because, when h iI > 0 = h iN ; the wage rate of immigrants is lower than that of native workers of the same skill type; that is, w iI < w iN , because immigrants are subject to higher search costs (see equation 17) . Intuitively, searching is costlier for immigrants, which forces them to accept lower wages. For a …rm, hiring an immigrant is therefore more pro…table than hiring a native, given that they are both equally productive. It follows that the increase in the immigrants'share of skilled labor force lowers the expected employment cost in the high-skill sector B H ; by lowering the probability that an unemployed and skilled worker is native ( H ): This spurs high-skill job entry with a concomitant increase in the matching rate and thus the outside option for high-skill workers. Consequently, this leads to an increase in the wage of high-skill native workers w HN ; given by equation (17), and a decrease in their unemployment rate u HN = U HN =1 (see equation 13 ). Finally, the market tightness L for low-skill workers is given by (15) . Note that if = 1; then L is independent of I H . Therefore, the wage rate and the unemployment rate for low-skill workers will remain the same, following an in ‡ux of skilled immigrants. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 2 . Along the curve HH 
General Case
Next we analyze the equilibrium in the general case, where < 1 and h iI > 0. In this general case, a change in I L or I H can in ‡uence the equilibrium through the impact of such a change on both prices and expected employment costs.
From our analysis above, we can infer that in this general case the impact of an increase in the number of immigrants will be unambiguously positive, both in terms of wages and employment, on the native workers whose skills become relatively more scarce, owing to the entry of new immigrants. However, the impact on the natives whose skills become relatively more abundant is in general ambiguous. This is so because the price e¤ect is negative (Proposition 2), whereas the employment cost e¤ect is positive (Proposition 3).
In this section we therefore calibrate the general model to the US data with the aim to quantitatively assess the overall impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes (wages and unemployment rates) for natives of both skill groups. We further use this calibration exercise to provide insights on how immigration a¤ects the total steady-state surplus of the economy, i.e., the total income to natives net of the ‡ow cost of vacancies. 5 We make the assumption that all …rms belong to natives, who therefore receive all the 5 The change in net income is a conventional measure of welfare change in this class of models (see, e.g., Acemoglu 2001). net pro…ts. Thus, our measure of net income to natives (labeled as surplus 1) is given by
i.e., it is equal to the total ‡ow of output, Y , plus the output-equivalent ‡ow to unemployed native workers, b H U HN + b L U LN , minus the ‡ow costs of vacancies, c H V H + c L V L , minus the wages paid to employed immigrants, w HI (I H U HI )+w LI (I L U LI ). We also consider an alternative measure of the net income to natives (labeled as surplus 2) that does not include the income enjoyed by the unemployed, that is,
In what follows we …rst describe the baseline calibration and then discuss the quantitative predictions of the general model. We end the section with a sensitivity analysis with respect to the production parameters and .
Calibration
For both simplicity and realism (see Blanchard and Diamond, 1991) , we use a Cobb-Douglas matching function, M = U " i V 1 " i , which exhibits standard properties. The scale parameter indexes the e¢ ciency of the matching process.
Our model economy is fully characterized by 21 parameters. The interest rate, r;
the parameters in the matching function, and ", the workers'bargaining power, , the production parameters, ; ; and x, the job separation rates, s L and s H , the capital depreciation rate, , the numbers of skilled and unskilled immigrants, I L and I H , the population birth rate, n; the share of unskilled labor force, , the unemployment ‡ow incomes, b L and b H , the vacancy costs, c L and c H , and the search costs, h LI and h HI . We choose the parameters of the model to match the US data during the period January 1990
to December 1999. We then simulate the e¤ects of a decade-long increase in the number of immigrants, corresponding to the period 2000-2009. One period in the model economy represents one month, so all the parameters are interpreted monthly. A summary of our calibration is given in Table 1 .
First, we calculated the average 30-year treasury constant maturity bond rate and the average GDP de ‡ator over the period 1990-1999. The di¤erence between these two …gures, which constitutes a measure of the real interest rate, is 4:76%, implying a monthly rate (r) of approximately 0:4%. This is a commonly used value. Second, following common practice, we set the unemployment elasticity of the matching function (") to 0:5, which is within the range of estimates reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). Third, following the literature, we postulate the worker's bargaining power ( ) to be 0:5, so that the Hosios condition ( = ") is met (Hosios, 1990) . Fourth, as in Krusell et al.
(2000), we de…ne as skilled a worker with at least a Bachelor's degree. 6 Moreover, in our baseline calibration we adopt their parameter estimates for the US economy, = 0:401 and = 0:495, but we also perform an extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameters. 7 Fifth, using matched monthly data from the basic Current Population Survey (CPS), we estimated the average skilled and unskilled separation rates to be 0:019
and 0:034, respectively. 8 Sixth, data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) give a value of 0:0061 for the monthly depreciation rate of the capital stock. 9 Seventh, for the initial numbers of skilled and unskilled immigrants we set I L = 0:089 and I H = 0:036.
Data for these measures come from the Public Use Microdata (PUM) of the 1990 and 2000 US Censuses. We de…ne as "immigrants" non-citizens and naturalized citizens. 10 Eighth, using also PUM and applying the same restrictions as in footnote 10, we …nd the monthly growth rate of the native labor force to be 0:071%. Finally, the percentage of US-born workers without a Bachelor's degree is set to = 0:726, as measured from the March CPS. Thus, the percentage of college graduates (I H =(I L + I H )) is slightly higher among immigrants than among native labor force (1 ) (0:288 vis-à-vis 0:274):
We jointly calibrated the remaining nine parameters by matching nine calibration targets obtained from US data over the period of interest, namely, 1990-1999. More speci…cally, our …rst two targets are the average employment rates of workers with at least a Bachelor's degree and of workers with less than a Bachelor's degree. Using data 6 Our production technology (described in equations 1 and 2) assumes that workers within each of the two skill groups are perfect substitutes to each other. Given that we allow for only two skill groups, this assumption may seem relatively strong. However, a variety of estimates based on US data suggest that given our partition of workers into "high-school equivalents" and "college equivalents", the simple two-skill model that we employ works. Workers of di¤erent age and experience within each of these two skill groups tend to be perfect substitutes (see Card, 2009 for an overview of this evidence). 7 Many recent time series studies …nd the elasticity of substitution between college and high school graduates to be in the range 1:5 2:5; the implied values for are in the range 0:3 0:6 (see Card 2009 ). 8 These measures include employment to unemployment and employment to inactivity transitions. In Chassamboulli and Palivos (2012) , we show that when the employment to inactivity transitions are excluded from our calculations of the separation rates, the results are essentially una¤ected. 9 The de…nition of capital stock that we used includes nonresidential equipment and software as well as nonresidential structures. 10 To obtain appropriate values of I L and I H we divide the number of immigrants in the data by the native labor force, because in the model the native labor force is normalized to unity. As census data are available only every 10 years, we take the average over the years 1990 and 2000 only. The samples used to compute these and all other relevant measures include only ages 25 to 65, while they exclude those who are not in the labor force (report zero weeks of work, no wage income or are enrolled in school) as well as those who are in the military. from the March CPS, we found them 0:976 and 0:939; respectively. Moreover, using data also from the March CPS, we estimated the college-plus wage premium to be 61:1%:
Our next target is the capital to output ratio, which was computed using BEA data.
Speci…cally, the capital stock is de…ned as in footnote 9: This variable was then divided by a measure of private output that is equal to GDP Gross Housing Value Added
Compensation of Government Employees. This way, we found the value of 1:348 for the capital to output ratio. Our …fth target is the vacancy to unemployment ratio. Using the Conference Board's Help-Wanted Index (HWI), this was found equal to 0:620. 11 
Results
Using PUM, we …nd that the change in I L and I H between January 2000 and December 2009 was 0:051 and 0:026; respectively, i.e., 5.1% and 2.6% of the native labor force.
Moreover, the total increase in the US labor force resulting from international immigration over this period was 6:8%. 12 Crucially, the immigration in ‡ux over the period of interest 11 Data on vacancies from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) are only available since December 2000. The best available proxy for the number of vacant jobs for the years prior to 2000 is the Conference Board's HWI. We adjusted the HWI to the JOLTS units of measurement using the JOLTS data and then divided by the unemployment rate, as measured from the March CPS …les, to obtain the vacancy to unemployment ratio over the period of interest. 12 In conducting their simulation exercises, Borjas and Katz (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) used an immigrant in ‡ux that increased the size of the total workforce by 11:0% and 11:4%, respectively. is biased towards skilled labor. More speci…cally, it follows from the aforementioned data that ; the ratio of unskilled to skilled labor, decreased from 2:629 to 2:577: 13 In Table 2 we summarize the e¤ects of an immigration in ‡ux of the same magnitude and composition in terms of skills as the one in the data. We report results obtained from the general model, calibrated as described above, but also, for comparability, from three alternative speci…cations. In the …rst, we set h LI = h HI = 0; hence, there are only price e¤ects (this is the case considered in Proposition 2). In the second speci…cation, we keep the assumption h HI = 0, but set h LI = 1:182, as calibrated above. Finally, in the last case, we set h LI = 0 and h HI equal to the calibrated value of 4:203. 14 Table 2) the increase in the number of immigrants causes L to rise and H to fall in line with When we allow for skilled immigrants and natives to have di¤erential search costs (third column), the impact of the same immigration in ‡ux on skilled job entry turns from negative to positive and large. In this case, despite the fall in the price of the skilled labor input, the rise in the number of skilled immigrants encourages the entry of skilled jobs by lowering the expected cost of hiring a skilled worker. The consequent increase in their job …nding rate, causes their unemployment rate to fall. However, the drop in their marginal product dominates the improvement in their job …nding rate and thus their bargaining position in wage setting weakens. Therefore, their wage still falls.
When natives and immigrants face identical search costs (second column in
Because skilled and unskilled labor are complements in the production of the …nal good, the presence of di¤erential search costs between immigrant and native skilled workers improves the impact of immigration on the unskilled native workers as well, in terms of both employment and wages. The immigration-induced increase in skilled job entry, and as a consequence in Y H , leads to an even larger increase in the price of the unskilled labor input and therefore to an even larger increase in L .
The same immigration in ‡ux has also a more positive impact on natives of both skill types when di¤erential search costs between immigrant and native unskilled workers are introduced (fourth column). In this case, the decline in the expected cost B L of …rms seeking to establish an employment relation with an unskilled worker adds to the increase in the price of the unskilled labor input, causing a much larger increase in unskilled job entry, and as a consequence, a much larger fall in the unemployment rate of unskilled workers. Reasoning as above, the larger increase in the unskilled labor input, Y L , bene…ts also the skilled workers. Speci…cally, the increase in Y L raises the marginal product of skilled workers, thereby counteracting partially the adverse e¤ect of immigration on the price of the skilled labor input, p H . The drop in H is therefore smaller in this case compared to the case where immigrants and native unskilled workers are identical.
The results of the general model calibrated to the US data -where immigrants and natives of both skill types face di¤erential search costs and hence have di¤erent wagesare summarized in the last column of Table 2 . As above, the drop in the expected cost B L reinforces the e¤ect of the rise in the price of the unskilled labor input on unskilled job entry, leading to a large increase in the tightness prevailing in the unskilled sector.
As a result, the unemployment rate of unskilled workers drops by 0:64 percentage points.
Because the wage of skilled immigrants is also signi…cantly lower than that of skilled natives, the immigration in ‡ux causes a large decline also in the expected employment cost of …rms seeking to hire skilled workers. Job entry in the skilled sector therefore rises, causing the unemployment rate of skilled workers to fall by 0:38 percentage points. In terms of wages, for the reasons explained above, the wage of unskilled native workers increases by 0:24 percentage points; while that of skilled native workers falls by 0:31 percentage points.
In all cases considered, the surge in immigration lowers the unemployment rate of natives overall and raises the total native income. With di¤erential search costs, the impact is also positive on the overall wage of native workers although quantitatively small. Hence, the immigration in ‡ow raises the surplus of native workers, mainly because it induces job creation. The largest increase in income and native wage rate and the largest fall in the native unemployment rate occur when immigrants of both types earn lower wages than their competing natives, as the US data dictate. In this case, the native unemployment rate falls by 0:57 percentage points and the native wage rate increases by 0:07 percentage points; leading to an increase in the surplus of natives between 0:28 (surplus1) and 0:46 (surplus 2) percentage points.
It is also worth commenting on the impact of the immigration in ‡ux on the labor market outcomes for the existing immigrants. Clearly, with identical search costs, immigration has the same consequences, both in terms of wages and unemployment, on workers of the same skill type, irrespective of their origin. Nevertheless, with di¤erential search costs the impact of immigration in terms of wages appears to be more positive on immigrants than on natives. To understand why recall that an increase in market tightness in ‡uences the equilibrium wage through two channels: 1) through its impact on the marginal product of labor; an increase in tightness raises employment and decreases the marginal product of labor, thereby lowering the wage; 2) through its impact on the worker's value of outside option; an increase in tightness raises the value of search, thereby strengthening the worker's position in wage setting, and in turn, causing his wage to rise.
When search is much costlier for immigrants than for natives, this second channel is much more important for the former, which explains why the impact of an immigration-induced increase in market tightness on their wage is more positive. For these workers, a small increase in their chances of …nding a job implies a much larger increase (in percentage terms) in their bargaining power and in turn on their wage.
Changing the Elasticity of Substitution between Labor and Capital
The results above are derived using the elasticities of substitution between the input factors estimated by Krusell et al. (2000) . Nevertheless, in this subsection we examine how robust the general model's predictions are to alternative values for the elasticities of substitution between capital and the skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.
For the nested CES production function, given in equations (1) In Table 3 
Extensions
Next we comment brie ‡y on three extensions of the model (details on these and more extensions are in Chassamboulli and Palivos 2012). First, we let immigrants be imperfect substitutes for native workers of the same type and hence have di¤erent marginal products and di¤erent prices. When we let just unskilled immigrants be imperfect substitutes for unskilled natives, we …nd our previous results to be robust. More speci…cally, as before, the skill-biased immigration analyzed here leads to higher job entry in both sectors, raises the wage of unskilled workers and lowers that of skilled native workers. Moreover, it raises the overall surplus accrued to natives.
When immigrants and natives of both labor types are imperfect substitutes, then the immigration in ‡ux has a positive impact on skilled (and unskilled) natives not only in terms of employment, but also in terms of wages. This is so because at lower values of the elasticity of substitution, the immigration-induced fall in the marginal product of skilled native workers is smaller. The skilled immigrants, by contrast, su¤er a larger decline in their marginal product as the degree of substitutability between native and immigrant skilled labor falls. Nevertheless, the wage of existing immigrants not only increases but increases much more than the wage of natives. As above, this is because immigrants have a much lower value of outside option, and thus wage, than natives, owing to their higher search cost. Consequently, the higher availability of jobs has a larger impact in percentage terms on their bargaining position and therefore wage.
Next, we allow for endogenous skill acquisition on behalf of native workers. We view this as an interesting case, as in the long run natives may react to any negative pressure from immigrants by adjusting their skill level; such adjustments cannot take place in the short run. Speci…cally, before entering the labor market we let each agent decide whether to invest in education and become skilled or remain unskilled. Native young agents di¤er with respect to their ability to learn, which in turn determines their cost of acquiring education.
We …nd that a skill-intensive increase in immigration, such as the one that took place from 2000 to 2009, raises the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor force, thereby lowering the marginal product of skilled and raising that of unskilled workers. In response to the downward (upward) pressure from immigration on the skilled (unskilled) wage, a higher share of the newly born native workforce chooses to remain unskilled. The resulting compositional shift in the native labor force towards unskilled workers acts to mitigate the negative (positive) impact of immigrants on the price of skilled (unskilled) input. It also raises (lowers) the expected cost of establishing an employment relation with an unskilled (skilled) worker by lowering (raising) the chances that a searching …rm will encounter an immigrant as opposed to a native unskilled (skilled) worker. These counteracting e¤ects lessen the positive (negative) e¤ects of skill-biased immigration on the wages and employment of unskilled (skilled) natives. Since the unskilled capture a larger share of the native labor force, the endogenous skill accumulation has a smaller positive impact on the overall surplus of natives, compared with the case were the skill distribution is …xed.
In the …nal extension of the basic model, we assume imperfect substitutability, as above, but, in addition to skill-speci…c jobs, we also allow for origin-speci…c vacancies, i.e., vacancies that are suited only for natives or only for immigrants. Hence, there are four intermediate sectors and four labor markets. By assumption, immigrants cannot search in the market for native jobs and vice versa. Thus, the number of skilled or unskilled immigrants does not a¤ect the probability that a type i and unemployed worker is native anymore. Consequently, there will be only price e¤ects and the impact of the skilledintensive increase in immigration on the matching rates is in general much smaller in magnitude.
For the native workers of both types the impact is still positive in terms of both employment and wages. For the unskilled native workers, both the increase in the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor and the increase in the immigrant to native unskilled labor push their marginal product up. Hence, …rms respond by opening more vacancies suited for unskilled-native workers. On the other hand, there are two countervailing e¤ects on the marginal product of the skilled native workers. First, the increase in the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor that tends to lower it, and second, the increase in the immigrant to native skilled labor that tends to raise it. However, as above, because immigrant and native skilled labor are imperfect substitutes the positive e¤ect dominates. Thus, job creation in the skilled sector increases.
In contrast to the case where immigrants and natives compete for the same jobs, when there are separate markets, the e¤ect of higher job creation on previous immigrants disappears. The entry of new immigrants does not lower the expected employment cost of …rms searching for immigrant labor and thus does not encourage the creation of vacancies suited for immigrants. Instead, as immigrant labor becomes relatively more abundant its price falls relative to the price of the native labor input, with negative consequence on the number of jobs available to immigrants and on their wage.
Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the e¤ects of immigration on the native population in a search and matching model, where search frictions generate unemployment and break the link between marginal products and wages. Within this framework, we have been able to explicitly account for the unemployment and wage e¤ects that come from the impact of immigration on the availability of jobs. Most of the existing contributions to the immigration literature overlook such e¤ects by adopting a Walrasian market-clearing determination of wages. Other features of our model that deserve attention are: heterogeneity in terms of skills, which allows for the analysis of distributional e¤ects across di¤erent skill types; a generalized production technology, which requires both capital and labor and accounts for the e¤ects of immigration on input prices; di¤erential search costs, which can explain the equilibrium wage gap between otherwise identical native and immigrant workers; imperfect substitutability between native and immigrant workers of the same type, which makes the marginal products of these two labor groups di¤erent; directed search on behalf of …rms, which contrasts with the previous results since the e¤ects of immigration through the employment costs disappear; and …nally endogenous skill acquisition on behalf of natives, which gives them the opportunity to react to the negative pressure of immigration.
Within the con…nes of our basic model we have shown that the in ‡ux of skill-biased immigration has two countervailing e¤ects on skilled domestic labor. First, it lowers the marginal product of the skilled labor input, thereby discouraging the creation of skilled jobs. Second, it makes opening vacancies suited for skilled workers more pro…table to …rms, because …rms anticipate that they will be able to pay lower wages to immigrants that have higher search costs. In our calibrated baseline economy, where we let immigrant and native workers of the same type be perfect substitutes in production, we have found that the second e¤ect dominates leading to a higher availability of skilled jobs and lower unemployment among skilled native workers. The higher availability of skilled jobs also strengthens the workers'bargaining position in wage setting, which acts to mitigate the negative e¤ect of the immigration-induced fall in their marginal product on their wages.
With regard to unskilled workers, we found that skill-biased immigration raises their wages and lowers their unemployment rate, because of their higher marginal product and the lower employment cost expected by …rms. We have shown that these results are robust under various choices of values for the production-function parameters that drive the elasticities of substitution between the three inputs, as well as all labor market institutional parameters. We have also shown that in a calibrated version of the model where natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes in production, the in ‡ow of skilled immigrants bene…ts skilled native workers, not only in terms of employment but also in terms of wages. The college-plus wage premium: 61:1%. z = 0:714
The ratio of unemployment to employment income of 0:71% for both skill groups (Hall and Milgrom, 2008 Notes: The variable indicates the wage rate, the unemployment rate, the tightness in the labor market, and the output of the final good. The subscript stands for unskilled, for skilled, for native and for immigrant. The term "surplus" refers to total income net of the flow cost of vacancies. The measure "surplus 1" includes the unemployment benefits, whereas the measure "surplus 2" does not. 
